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INTRODUCTION
“Destined for something big? Do it in the navy. Get a career. An
education. And a chance to serve a greater cause. For a FREE Navy
video call 1-800-510-2074.”1 This text message, received May 10,
2006, formed the basis of Jose Gomez’s claim against Campbell-
Ewald Company, an advertising and marketing communications
agency contracted in 2000 by the Navy to handle all of its advertis-
ing.2 Notably, Campbell-Ewald did not send the text message or
even identify Gomez as a potential Navy recruit.3 Instead, Mind-
Matics, a subcontractor specializing in mobile marketing, “handled
the deployment, transmission and delivery of the text messages, in-
cluding the use of its own SMS short code.”4
In 2006, Navy Recruiting Command (NRC), the recruitment
division of the Navy, in coordination with Campbell-Ewald, adopted
a wireless recruiting strategy aimed at recruiting nearly 38,000
active duty Navy sailors by primarily targeting males between the
ages of seventeen-and-a-half and twenty-four.5 To implement the
plan, Campbell-Ewald requested bid proposals from subcontractors
with expertise in mobile marketing.6 MindMatics responded, sug-
gesting a direct text message program targeting “cell phones of
150,000 Adults 18-24 from an opt-in list of over 3 million [individu-
als].”7
Before proceeding, Campbell-Ewald sought and obtained the
Navy’s approval.8 The NRC provided oversight and approval of
Campbell-Ewald’s text message recruiting campaign on behalf of the
Navy.9 Lee Buchschacher, Deputy Director of the Marketing and
Advertising Plans Division for the NRC, and “Cornell Galloway, an
Enlisted Program Advertising Manager, ‘authorized and approved
1. Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., No. CV 10-02007 DMG (CWx), 2013 WL 655237, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013), vacated, 768 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016).
2. See id. at *1-3.
3. See id. at *3. 
4. Id.
5. Id. at *1-2.
6. Id.
7. Id. at *2.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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the text message campaign proposed by MindMatics.’”10 Moreover,
Buchschacher “reviewed, revised, and approved” the Navy’s text
message.11
MindMatics sent the text messages approved by the Navy be-
tween May 10 and May 24, 2006.12 Gomez, who alleged that he had
not opted-in to receive text messages but had erroneously received
a message,13 brought a class action lawsuit pursuant to the Tele-
phone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)14 on behalf of himself and
“all persons in the United States and its Territories who received
one or more unauthorized text message advertisements.”15
The TCPA was passed originally in 1991 as an amendment to the
Communications Act of 1934.16 The idea was to place restrictions on
telephone solicitations and to set limitations on the use of auto-
mated telephone equipment in telemarketing.17 The TCPA prohibits
anyone from making an automated call, without first obtaining
express consent, to the cellular phones of individuals within the
United States.18 Notably, a text message constitutes a call for the
purposes of the TCPA.19 Moreover, Gomez was able to sue Campbell-
Ewald instead of MindMatics because of the doctrine of vicarious
liability.20 Although the TCPA does not speak to whether vicarious
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at *3.
13. Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2014) (stating that Gomez
“did not consent to receipt of the text message,” and “that he was 40 years old at the time he
received the message, well outside of the Navy’s target market”), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012).
15. See Class Action Complaint at 2, 4-5, Gomez, 2010 WL 11240892 (No. CV 10-02007
DMG (CWx)).
16. Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243, Sec. 3, 105
Stat. 2394, 2395 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2012)).
17. See 137 CONG. REC. 36,300 (1991) (statement of Sen. Hollings) (“The bill includes pro-
visions to restrict telephone calls that use an automated or computerized voice. These calls
are a nuisance and an invasion of our privacy. The complaints received by the Federal Com-
munications Commission ... indicate that people find these calls to be objectionable regardless
of the content of the message or the initiator of the call. Restricting such calls is constitu-
tionally acceptable as a reasonable place and manner restriction.”).
18. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 
19. See Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct.
663 (2016).
20. See id. at 877. Vicarious liability in the context of independent contractors is defined
as follows: “A person whose liability is imputed based on the tortious acts of another is liable
for the entire share of comparative responsibility assigned to the other, regardless of whether
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liability applies, courts ordinarily interpret silence from Congress
to imply that “Congress intended to apply the traditional standards
of vicarious liability.”21
Campbell-Ewald, however, would still seem to have an airtight
defense to avoid liability. It was acting as an agent of the United
States as a contractor for the Navy, and thus may invoke derivative
sovereign immunity,22 an affirmative defense that shields contrac-
tors from liability when performing work for a government body.23
Because Congress did not authorize TCPA suits against the federal
government, the Navy cannot be sued for violating the TCPA.24
Thus, it would seem that Campbell-Ewald, which worked closely
with the Navy and received its oversight and approval at different
steps throughout the process, would be immune from liability under
the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity.25
Yet, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected this argu-
ment, concluding that Campbell-Ewald did not qualify for deriva-
tive sovereign immunity in this case.26 The Court reasoned that the
doctrine did not apply because the contractor violated the TCPA by
sending text messages to recipients who had not consented to re-
ceive such messages.27 More abstractly, the Court held that “[w]hen
a contractor violates both federal law and the Government’s explicit
instruction ... no ‘derivative [sovereign] immunity’ shields the con-
tractor from suit by persons adversely affected by the violation.”28
While this holding might ostensibly follow common sense, this
Note demonstrates that the Court’s much-overlooked holding
joint and several liability or several liability is the governing rule for independent tortfeasors
who cause an indivisible injury.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
21. See Gomez, 768 F.3d at 877 (quoting Thomas v. Taco Bell Corp., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1079,
1084 (C.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d, 582 F. App’x 678 (9th Cir. 2014)).
22. See Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., No. CV 10-02007 DMG (CWx), 2013 WL 655237,
at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013), vacated, 768 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 663
(2016).
23. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1940) (establishing that the
doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity shields private entities contracted by the govern-
ment unless the contractor exceeds the authority granted by the government or that authority
was not validly conferred).
24. See Gomez, 2013 WL 655237, at *4.
25. See id. at *6.
26. See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).
27. See id. at 672-74.
28. Id. at 672.
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undermines the very purpose of derivative sovereign immunity, and
thus should be overturned in an appropriate subsequent case.29 This
Note further argues that the Supreme Court’s holding in Campbell-
Ewald Co. v. Gomez runs counter to the Court’s jurisprudence and
could have far-reaching inefficient implications, including mone-
tarily incentivizing the federal government to integrate vertically
the production of goods and services that could otherwise be pro-
vided by the private market at lower social costs.30
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I analyzes the development
and history of derivative sovereign immunity. Part II focuses on how
the holding in Campbell-Ewald contradicts the Court’s jurispru-
dence and argues that the Court’s unworkable standard will create
uncertainty for private entities that contract with the government.
Part III considers the unintended consequences of Campbell-
Ewald’s holding, including the increased costs of using government
contractors who will inevitably increase prices to offset the costs of
expected litigation. Part III also predicts that the quality of services
and products available to the government will diminish, as potential
independent contractors who lack the risk appetite sufficient to take
on the increased risk imposed by the Court’s Campbell-Ewald
holding will exit the market. Part IV argues that the increased mon-
etary costs to the government of outsourcing projects to private
firms could lead the government to integrate vertically to take over
the functions in question because it will incur lower pecuniary costs
in doing so. The Note concludes that this result would be both
normatively undesirable and economically inefficient because the
private sector could produce the relevant good or service at a lower
social cost.
I. HISTORY OF DERIVATIVE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
This Part analyzes the development and history of derivative
sovereign immunity. The first Section discusses Yearsley v. W.A.
Ross Construction Co., the landmark case in which the Supreme
29. Notably, neither Chief Justice John Roberts nor Justice Samuel Alito addressed this
holding in their dissents. See id. at 677-83 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 683-85 (Alito, J.,
dissenting); see also infra Part II.
30. See infra Part IV.
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Court recognized the government contractor defense for the first
time,31 and how derivative sovereign immunity developed in the
area of public works. The next Section explores the development of
the derivative sovereign immunity doctrine in the area of products
liability and in the military contractor context. The final Section
examines the Court’s application of derivative sovereign immunity
to § 1983 cases, which illustrates how the Court has expanded the
doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity to include service con-
tracts as well as contracts for manufactured goods and public works.
A. Derivative Sovereign Immunity’s Foundations in Public Works
In its seminal derivative sovereign immunity case, the Supreme
Court held that there is no liability on the part of a contractor when
the government has validly conferred on it the authority to execute
a project and that project is within the authority of the government
to undertake.32 In Yearsley, the government hired a contractor to
improve navigation on the Missouri River, which required building
several dikes along the river.33 The plaintiffs in the case sued the
contractor after the construction had caused flooding of ninety-five
acres of the plaintiffs’ farmland.34 The Supreme Court held that the
contractor was not liable for the resulting damages based on an
agency theory of derivative sovereign immunity, concluding that
“[t]he action of the agent is ‘the act of the government.’”35 Thus, the
Yearsley rule afforded protection to contractors from liability when
the contractor had followed the government’s guidelines, had acted
under authority that has been validly conferred, and had served as
an agent of the government.36
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Yearsley to an environ-
mental case, concluding that private companies could not be liable
for alleged environmental damages caused by their dredging activ-
ities performed pursuant to contracts with the federal government.37
31. 309 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1940).
32. See id.
33. Id. at 19.
34. Id. at 19-20.
35. See id. at 21-22 (quoting United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 465-66 (1903)). 
36. See id. at 20-21. 
37. See Ackerson v. Bean Dredging LLC, 589 F.3d 196, 206-07 (5th Cir. 2009).
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There was no allegation that the companies lacked authority to
develop or maintain the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO).38
The Fifth Circuit held that the companies were executing Congress’s
will in dredging the MRGO, as evinced by the fact that the federal
government paid companies to dredge the MRGO on an annual
basis.39 Finally, there was no allegation that the companies deviated
from Congress’s direction or expectations.40 Thus, the Fifth Circuit,
relying on Yearsley, confirmed that, when a contractor has per-
formed the will of the government and the government conferred the
authority properly, the government contractor is not liable for any
resulting damages to private parties.41
More recently, a federal district court in Texas distinguished the
Supreme Court’s holding in Campbell-Ewald on the ground that the
decision left undisturbed the Court’s Yearsley holding when it comes
to government contractors in the context of public works.42 In
Benson v. Russell’s Cuthand Creek Ranch, Ltd., the federal govern-
ment had authorized Ducks Unlimited (DU) to construct a levee
system in furtherance of a public works project designed to protect
and restore wetlands.43 The dispute arose over whether construct-
ing the levee system at its present location on the property was
negligent.44 There was no dispute, however, “that DU had the au-
thority [from the government] to build a levee system on the ...
property in furtherance of the [Wetlands Reserve Program].”45
The court concluded that DU had a viable defense against the
Texas Water Code because “there can be no reasonable dispute that
the contract and specifications under the contract called for DU to
build a levee system for the government on the Russell property
pursuant to a public project, and that DU did not exceed its auth-





42. See Benson v. Russell’s Cuthand Creek Ranch, Ltd., 183 F. Supp. 3d 795, 805-06 (E.D.
Tex. 2016).
43. Id. at 799.
44. See id. at 799-801.
45. Id. at 806.
46. Id. at 809. 
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more permissive Yearsley framework to the public works context,
extending to DU the protection of derivative sovereign immunity.47
B. Derivative Sovereign Immunity’s Development Through
Products Liability
Some commentators have noted that Yearsley, which serves as the
clearest example of derivative sovereign immunity under agency
theory, is difficult to apply.48 That is because in certain contexts,
especially with regard to military contractors, it can be difficult to
establish an agency relationship between the contractor and the
government.49 To preserve the force of the doctrine of derivative
sovereign immunity, the Court moved toward a contract specifica-
tion defense, meaning that, when a contractor adheres to the spec-
ifications given by the government, the contractor will not be liable
“if the specified design or material turns out to be insufficient to
make the chattel safe for use, unless it is so obviously bad that a
competent contractor would realize that there was a grave chance
that his product would be dangerously unsafe.”50
The contract specification defense developed in response to what
has become known as the Feres-Stencel doctrine.51 In Feres v. United
States—a consolidated decision arising out of a circuit split involv-
ing three actions52 against the United States based on the Federal
47. See id. at 806, 809.
48. See, e.g., Michael Overly, Note, Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.: The Turning Point
for the Government Contractor Defense?, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 935, 939-41 (1988). 
49. See Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 564 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The problem with
applying the Yearsley defense in the context of the military contractor is the apparent require-
ment that the contractor possess an actual agency relationship with the government.”); see
also Overly, supra note 48, at 940.
50. Overly, supra note 48, at 941-42 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 404 cmt.
a (AM. LAW. INST. 1965)).
51. The doctrine developed from the holdings of two Supreme Court cases. See Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (holding that the government was not liable under
the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen arising out of or in the course of
activity incident to military service); Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666,
670-74 (1977) (holding that the United States was not liable under the Federal Tort Claims
Act to indemnify the manufacturer of an ejection system found liable for the death of a U.S.
serviceman on the theory that any malfunction in the ejection system was due to faulty
government specifications and components).
52. The first action was the Feres case. Feres, 340 U.S. at 136-37. In that case, the
executrix of Feres’s estate sued the United States to recover for death caused by negligence.
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Tort Claims Act—the Court sought to resolve the question of
“whether the Tort Claims Act extends its remedy to one sustaining
‘incident to the service’ what under other circumstances would be an
actionable wrong.”53 The Court ultimately concluded that the gov-
ernment was not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for
injuries to servicemen arising out of, or in the course of, activity
incident to military service.54
The result of this holding was that members of the military or
their representatives began suing military contractors who had
manufactured the government-designed equipment that caused
their injuries.55 In many instances, however, manufacturers had
only minimal discretion in the design specifications that caused the
injuries.56 While Feres increased the risk of liability to government
contractors, whether contractors would be able to seek indemnifi-
cation from the government was ostensibly an undecided issue.
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States foreclosed this
potential remedy, holding that government contractors could not sue
Id. She alleged that Feres, who burned to death in the barracks at Pine Camp, New York,
while on active duty, died due to the government’s negligence in “quartering him in barracks
known or which should have been known to be unsafe because of a defective heating plant,
and in failing to maintain an adequate fire watch.” Id. at 137. The District Court dismissed
the action, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 136-37.
The second action was the Jefferson case. Id. at 137. In that case, the plaintiff had an
abdominal operation while in the Army. Id. About eight months later, during another
operation after plaintiff was discharged, a towel “marked ‘Medical Department U.S. Army,’
was discovered and removed from his stomach.” Id. The complaint alleged that the army
surgeon negligently left it there. Id. After trial, the district court concluded that the Torts
Claim Act does not charge the United States with liability in this type of case. Id. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.
The third action was the Griggs case. Id. In that case, Griggs’s executrix alleged that, while
Griggs was on active duty, he died “because of negligent and unskillful medical treatment by
army surgeons.” Id. The district court dismissed, but the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. Id.
53. Id. at 138.
54. See id. at 146.
55. R. Todd Johnson, Comment, In Defense of the Government Contractor Defense, 36
CATH. U. L. REV. 219, 226 (1986). 
56. See, e.g., Tillett v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 599 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that the
government’s design specifications did not include roll-over protection on the front end loader);
McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983) (concluding that the ejector
system designed by Rockwell conformed with the government’s specifications); Sanner v. Ford
Motor Co., 364 A.2d 43, 44 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (noting that government con-
tractual specifications “did not include the installation of seat belts, roll bars or side doors”),
aff’d, 381 A.2d 805 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
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the government to recover for damages the contractor had paid to
injured military servicemen.57 Notably, this holding barred govern-
ment contractors from recovering even when the contractor manu-
factured the equipment causing the injuries in accordance with
government specifications.58 The Court reasoned, “[T]he third-party
indemnity action in this case is unavailable for essentially the same
reasons that the direct action ... is barred by Feres.”59 Moreover, the
Court rested its analysis on the policy that it was improper to allow
claims—either direct actions by injured servicemen or actions for
indemnity by contractors to recover damages paid—when the trial
would require second-guessing military decisions.60 Thus, as one
commentator noted, it seemed that “[t]he Feres-Stencel doctrine
presented an insurmountable obstacle for government contrac-
tors.”61
But the Feres-Stencel doctrine, although developed by the Su-
preme Court, did not doom government contractors in all products
liability cases involving a military contract. In Sanner v. Ford Motor
Co., the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, just six
months after the Stencel decision, affirmed a lower court’s decision,
which held that Ford could not be liable for any defect in a jeep
manufactured for the military.62 This was because the defendant
“had no discretion with respect to the installation of seatbelts and
... strictly adhered to the plans and specifications owned and
provided by the Government.”63 Importantly, the Sanner court rec-
ognized the need for derivative sovereign immunity in cases where
the government contractor had manufactured a product in strict
compliance with the federal government’s specifications.64
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit laid the foundation of the modern
government contractor defense just five years later, holding that the
57. See Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673-74 (1977).
58. Overly, supra note 48, at 946.
59. Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp., 431 U.S. at 673.
60. See id. 
61. Overly, supra note 48, at 947.
62. 381 A.2d 805, 806 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (per curiam).
63. Id.
64. See Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 364 A.2d 43, 47 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (“A
manufacturer is bound to comply with plans and specifications provided to it by the
Government in the production of military equipment. If it does it is insulated from liability.”),
aff’d, 381 A.2d 805 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
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contractor was not liable for damages in cases in which the United
States reviewed and approved a detailed set of specifications, and
the contractor complied with the specifications.65 The Ninth Circuit
justified its ruling in McKay v. Rockwell International Corp. by ad-
hering to the logic of the Feres-Stencel doctrine.66 First, it reasoned
that holding the manufacturer liable in government contractor cases
when the manufacturer adhered to precise standards set by the
government would undermine one of the purposes of sovereign
immunity itself because “military suppliers, despite the govern-
ment’s immunity, would pass the cost of accidents off to the United
States through cost overrun provisions in equipment contracts,
through reflecting the price of liability insurance in the contracts,
or through higher prices in later equipment sales.”67 Second, the
court reasoned that holding “military suppliers liable for defective
designs where the United States set or approved the design spec-
ifications would thrust the judiciary into the making of military de-
cisions.”68 This would have directly contradicted Stencel, which
prohibited anyone—let alone courts—from second-guessing military
decisions.69
Finally, the Ninth Circuit underscored the importance of the
government contractor defense in the military context.70 Rather
than risk discouraging collaboration between contractors and the
government, the court stated that the “defense provides incentives
for suppliers of military equipment to work closely with and to con-
sult the military authorities in the development and testing of
equipment.”71 The Ninth Circuit’s public policy rationale was to pro-
mote precision of design for military equipment that would other-
wise not be achievable in the absence of the government contractor
defense.72
Several years later, the Supreme Court weighed in on the issue
again, deciding under what circumstances “a contractor providing
65. See McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 450-51 (9th Cir. 1983).
66. Id. at 449.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977).
70. See McKay, 704 F.2d at 450. 
71. Id.
72. See id. 
1502 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1491
military equipment to the Federal Government can be held liable
under state tort law for injury caused by a design defect.”73 On
appeal to the Supreme Court, Boyle’s chief contention was that
there was “no justification ... for shielding Government contractors
from liability for design defects in military equipment.”74 Justice
Antonin Scalia, writing for a five-to-four majority, disagreed.75 The
Court held that liability of independent contractors performing work
for the federal government is an area of uniquely federal concern,
despite the absence of legislation specifically immunizing a govern-
ment contractor from liability for design defects.76 As such, the
Court held that state tort law must yield to the federal concern so
that the manufacturer can avoid liability because “imposition of
liability on Government contractors will directly affect the terms of
Government contracts: either the contractor will decline to manufac-
ture the design specified by the Government, or it will raise its
price. Either way, the interests of the United States will be directly
affected.”77 To determine when displacement of state law will occur,
Justice Scalia adopted the Ninth Circuit’s test from McKay, holding
that liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be
imposed “when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise
specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications;
and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in
the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to
the United States.”78
The Court’s holding reflected that the federal government has a
paramount interest in the military procurement process.79 Indeed,
“[f ]ew, if any, other contracts rival the interest of the federal gov-
ernment in military procurement.”80 Similar to performance con-
tracts, the federal government must also rely on civilian contractors
73. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 502 (1988).
74. Id. at 503.
75. Id. at 504.
76. Id. at 504-06. 
77. Id. at 507.
78. Id. at 512.
79. Id. at 506 (“[I]t is plain that the Federal Government’s interest in the procurement of
equipment is implicated by suits such as the present one—even though the dispute is one
between private parties.”).
80. See John R. Secrest & Scott R. Torpey, U.S. Supreme Court Adopts and Expands the
Government Contractor Defense, 68 MICH. B.J. 132, 133 (1989). 
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to design or manufacture military products.81 Thus, the Court
reasoned that the federal government’s reliance on nongovernment
entities in the military procurement area in particular justified
extending the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity and the
government contractor defense to civilian procurement contractors
to mirror the treatment of civilian performance contracts.82
C. Derivative Sovereign Immunity’s Expansion to § 1983 Cases
Beyond public works contracts and military defense contracts, the
doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity has also played a role in
§ 1983 cases, civil actions for deprivation of civil rights, which can-
not be brought against the state or federal government.83 The
question of derivative sovereign immunity is pivotal in § 1983 cases
in which a litigant brings an action against a private actor con-
tracted by the state, because the statute holds liable any private
person who, “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”84 Thus, if deriv-
ative sovereign immunity extends to the private contractor, the
contractor will be immune from liability under the statute.85
Notably, the expansion of the doctrine of derivative sovereign im-
munity to include § 1983 cases is critical to this Note’s analysis of
Campbell-Ewald, as these cases involve contractors who provide
services rather than merely manufactured goods.
Two cases illustrate how the Supreme Court has shifted its
jurisprudence from withholding immunity from private actors to
81. See id.
82. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 506 (“The federal interest justifying this holding surely exists as
much in procurement contracts as in performance contracts; we see no basis for a distinc-
tion.”); see Secrest & Torpey, supra note 80, at 133. 
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)
(“Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but it
does not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged
deprivations of civil liberties. The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits unless the State has
waived its immunity, or unless Congress has exercised its undoubted power under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to override that immunity.” (citation omitted)).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
85. See Will, 491 U.S. at 66.
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extending it to those performing a traditionally public function in
§ 1983 cases. In 1997, the Court, in a five-to-four decision, held that
prison guards who are employees of a private prison management
firm are not entitled to qualified immunity from suit by prisoners
charging a violation of § 1983, because history does not reveal a
firmly rooted tradition of immunity applicable to privately employ-
ed prison guards, and the immunity doctrine’s purposes do not
warrant immunity for private prison guards.86 The Court reasoned
that history does not support the claim of derivative sovereign
immunity because “correctional facilities have never been exclu-
sively public”87 and there was “no conclusive evidence of a historical
tradition of immunity for private parties carrying out these func-
tions.”88
The Court, however, reversed course in 2012, when Chief Justice
John Roberts, writing for the majority, held that an attorney who
was retained by a city to assist in investigating a firefighter’s po-
tential wrongdoing was entitled to the protection of the sovereign’s
immunity in a firefighter’s § 1983 claim, even though the attorney
was not a permanent, full-time employee of the city.89 The Court
stated that the attorney, who was performing the same work as
government employees, was entitled to seek protection of qualified
immunity because the common law drew no distinction between
government employees and others working on behalf of the govern-
ment.90
The Court underscored that one of the reasons for extending
sovereign immunity to an attorney hired to work part-time for the
city was “to avoid ‘unwarranted timidity’ in performance of public
duties, ensuring that talented candidates are not deterred from pub-
lic service, and preventing the harmful distractions from carrying
out the work of government that can often accompany damages
suits.”91 By affording immunity to private individuals who work on
behalf of the government, the Court attempted to ensure that
talented individuals or firms are not deterred from working on
86. Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997).
87. Id. at 405.
88. Id. at 407.
89. Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 393-94 (2012).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 389-90 (quoting Richardson, 521 U.S. at 409-11).
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behalf of the government for fear of private suit.92 Moreover, the
Court recognized the need to protect private individuals working in
close coordination with public employees, who might be immune
from liability.93 While immunity would protect public employees,
private individuals or firms working alongside government employ-
ees “could be left holding the bag—facing full liability for actions
taken in conjunction with government employees.”94 The need to
protect private individuals in these circumstances is obvious, the
Court said, because “any private individual with a choice might
think twice before accepting a government assignment.”95
Thus, as recently as 2012, the Court has demonstrated its com-
mitment—through its jurisprudence in the public works, products
liability, and § 1983 contexts—to extending the doctrine of deriva-
tive sovereign immunity to private individuals and firms to protect
those individuals from liability from which government employees
are immune. The Court did so in order to ensure performance of
government duties free from distractions and to incentivize the most
qualified parties to work for the government.96 Diminishing the
doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity disserves the public
interest by exposing private firms and individuals to liability when
working with the government and incentivizes them to avoid
government contract work altogether.97 For “uncertain immunity is
little better than no immunity at all.”98
92. Id. 
93. See id. at 391.
94. Id.
95. Id.; see also Frank H. Stoy, Comment, Should Outside Counsel Be Left out in the Cold?
An Examination of Opposing Standards Regarding Qualified Immunity: Delia v. City of Rialto
and Cullinan v. Abramson, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 645, 657 (2012) (“Specifically, the Court granted
qualified immunity to outside counsel, because to decide otherwise would not only be contrary
to the purpose of qualified immunity, but it would also have a negative practical impact on
the way in which public sector lawyers represent their clients.”).
96. Filarsky, 566 U.S. at 389-90.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 392.
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II. CAMPBELL-EWALD CO. V. GOMEZ AND DERIVATIVE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY’S IMPORTANCE
This Part analyzes the Campbell-Ewald holding in light of Part
I. This Part focuses on why the Court’s holding is inconsistent with
its jurisprudence and why the rule from Campbell-Ewald will prove
to be an unworkable standard for courts to apply. Moreover, this
Part discusses the uncertainty this ruling will likely create for
private entities that contract with the government.
Derivative sovereign immunity case law illustrates that the avail-
ability of derivative sovereign immunity to private individuals and
firms working for the government is important in several respects.99
As Chief Justice Roberts noted in Filarsky v. Delia, exposing private
individuals and firms to liability while sovereign immunity shields
their public employee counterparts with whom they are working
offends logic and equitable principles; moreover, it discourages the
private sector from contracting with the government to serve the
public’s needs.100 Furthermore, derivative sovereign immunity also
indirectly protects the government—the very purpose of sovereign
immunity in the first place—because imposing liability on govern-
ment contractors will alter the terms of future contracts between
the government and private firms or individuals because contractors
either will raise prices or will decline to work for the government
altogether.101 Thus, any threat to the doctrine of derivative sover-
eign immunity could have far-reaching consequences on the
government’s ability to procure the goods or services it needs at a
price feasible to the public.102 The Supreme Court’s holding in
Campbell-Ewald threatens to diminish the important safeguards
provided by the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity, as it
reverses the Court’s trend of expanding the scope of derivative
sovereign immunity.103
99. See, e.g., id. at 389-90.
100. See id. at 391.
101. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988).
102. See id.
103. See supra Part I.
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At the outset, it is important to note a self-inflicted limitation of
the Court’s holding: it only applies when a contractor faces liability
for violating federal law.104 Thus, courts should interpret Campbell-
Ewald as leaving undisturbed the Court’s holding in Boyle, in which
Justice Scalia held that displacement of state law is appropriate
when the state law conflicts with uniquely federal interests, such as
when the government contracts with private individuals or firms to
procure goods or services.105 Instead, the Campbell-Ewald Court,
without enumerating a reason, narrowly held that derivative sover-
eign immunity does not protect contractors from liability “[w]hen a
contractor violates both federal law and the Government’s explicit
instructions.”106
In its brief rejection of Campbell-Ewald’s derivative sovereign
immunity defense, the Court surprisingly asserted that derivative
sovereign immunity, while it ostensibly insulates private parties
from liability, does not necessarily bestow on a private firm or indi-
vidual “the Government’s embracive immunity.”107 But this state-
ment directly contradicts the Chief Justice’s conclusion not even
four years before, namely that, “uncertain immunity is little better
than no immunity at all.”108
The Campbell-Ewald Court cited Filarsky, but failed to distin-
guish this case on any substantive grounds.109 Instead, the Court
only pointed out that Filarsky was a § 1983 case involving “qualified
immunity,” while the instant case involved complete immunity.110
But this is a distinction without difference for the derivative sov-
ereign immunity analysis because the rationale of Filarsky was
that the common law did not distinguish between how to treat full-
time government employees on the one hand and private firms or
104. See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016) (“When a contractor
violates ... federal law ... no ‘derivative immunity’ shields the contractor from suit by persons
adversely affected by the violation.”).
105. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507-08.
106. Campbell-Ewald Co., 136 S. Ct. at 672. 
107. Id. (“Campbell asserts ‘derivative sovereign immunity,’ but can offer no authority for
the notion that private persons performing Government work acquire the Government’s em-
bracive immunity.” (citation omitted)).
108. Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 392 (2012).
109. Campbell-Ewald Co., 136 S. Ct. at 673.
110. See id.
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individuals working on behalf of the government on the other.111
Thus, whether government employees are entitled to full or only
qualified immunity is of no moment because the doctrine of deriv-
ative sovereign immunity focuses only on extending to private indi-
viduals and firms working for the government the same protections
afforded to public employees.112
The Court also attempted to distinguish Yearsley from the present
case on the ground that there was no liability in Yearsley because
the contractor had performed its work as the government had di-
rected.113 Thus, the Court implied that Campbell-Ewald was subject
to liability because it had either exceeded its authority or had not
received validly conferred authority in the first place.114 But the
facts of the case, as recorded by the district court, require the oppo-
site conclusion, namely, (1) that the Navy validly conferred upon
Campbell-Ewald the authority to contract with MindMatics to ident-
ify potential Navy recruits and to send the Navy-approved text
message; and (2) that at no point did Campbell-Ewald exceed the
authority granted to it by the Navy.115
In the alternative, the Court suggested that Campbell-Ewald was
vicariously liable for the text messages sent to individuals who had
not opted in, even though MindMatics—and not Campbell-Ewald—
sent the messages because “there is vicarious liability for TCPA
violations.”116 The Court pointed out that the Navy had contracted
111. Filarsky, 566 U.S. at 393-94 (“Though not a public employee, Filarsky was retained
by the City to assist in conducting an official investigation into potential wrongdoing. There
is no dispute that government employees performing such work are entitled to seek the pro-
tection of qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals rejected Filarsky’s claim to the protection
accorded Wells, Bekker, and Peel solely because he was not a permanent, full-time employee
of the City. The common law, however, did not draw such distinctions.”).
112. See id. at 392-94.
113. Campbell-Ewald Co., 136 S. Ct. at 673; see also Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309
U.S. 18, 20-21 (1940).
114. Campbell-Ewald Co., 136 S. Ct. at 673 (“The Court contrasted with Yearsley cases in
which a Government agent had ‘exceeded his authority’ or the authority ‘was not validly
conferred’; in those circumstances, the Court said, the agent could be held liable for conduct
causing injury to another.”).
115. See Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., No. CV 10-02007 DMG (CWx), 2013 WL 655237,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013) (explaining that the Navy authorized and approved the text
message campaign proposed by MindMatics), vacated, 768 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136
S. Ct. 663 (2016).
116. Campbell-Ewald Co., 136 S. Ct. at 674; see also In re Joint Petition Filed by Dish Net-
work, LLC, 28 FCC Rcd. 6574, 6582 (2013) (“Our rules have long drawn a distinction between
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with Campbell-Ewald and relied on its expertise to send text mes-
sages using an opt-in list so as not to violate any local or federal
laws.117 The Court then suddenly concluded, “In short, the current
record reveals no basis for arguing that Gomez’s right to remain
message-free was in doubt or that Campbell complied with the
Navy’s instructions.”118 While Gomez certainly had a right to avoid
the Navy’s recruitment text message, Campbell-Ewald did exactly
what the Navy instructed it to do, even if the result happened to
violate federal law.119
The Navy closely collaborated with Campbell-Ewald on the May
2006 recruitment text message campaign, providing both “oversight
and approval.”120 Moreover, the Navy “reviewed, revised, and ap-
proved” the text message itself.121 Indeed, the Navy approved every
move made by Campbell-Ewald throughout the process, including
the decision to rely on MindMatics to identify an opt-in list of
potential Navy recruits and subsequently send the messages.122
Much like in Filarsky, where the private attorney worked in close
coordination with public officials,123 the Navy and Campbell-Ewald
worked harmoniously as they planned the Navy’s text message
recruitment campaign.124 Thus, the Navy, as much as Campbell-
Ewald, was responsible for Gomez receiving a text message in er-
ror, because both the Navy and Campbell-Ewald had jointly decided
to rely on MindMatics to send the text messages to individuals on
an opt-in list.125 Filarsky and the way in which the doctrine of deriv-
ative sovereign immunity has developed indicate that Campbell-
Ewald should enjoy the same immunity available to the Navy.126
the telemarketer who initiates a call and the seller on whose behalf a call is made. In
accordance with those rules, as we explain below, we clarify that a seller is not directly liable
for a violation of the TCPA unless it initiates a call, but may be held vicariously liable under
federal common law agency principles for a TCPA violation by a third-party telemarketer.”).
117. Campbell-Ewald Co., 136 S. Ct. at 673-74.
118. Id. at 674.
119. See id. at 673-74.
120. Gomez, 2013 WL 655237, at *2.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 393-94 (2012).
124. Gomez, 2013 WL 655237, at *2.
125. Id.
126. See supra Part I; see also, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506 (1988);
Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673-74 (1977); Feres v. United
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While the Court erred in its judgment, its more detrimental
misstep was to announce a new rule of derivative sovereign im-
munity that contradicts the Court’s precedent and will likely prove
to be an unworkable standard whenever a contractor violates fed-
eral law.127 According to the Court, a government contractor is not
entitled to derivative sovereign immunity “[w]hen a contractor
violates both federal law and the Government’s explicit instruc-
tions.”128 The first prong of the test is useful only in that it limits the
Court’s holding to scenarios that invoke federal—rather than
state—law.129 Otherwise, it has no value. After all, contractors only
benefit from the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity when
they have broken a law.130 On the other hand, the second element
that ostensibly requires contractors not to deviate at all from the
government’s explicit instructions is much more problematic.131
For starters, did Campbell-Ewald fail to follow the government’s
explicit instructions? The Court says so, because the Navy autho-
rized Campbell-Ewald to use MindMatics to send text messages to
individuals on an opt-in list, and Gomez was not on the list.132 But
how exactly did Campbell-Ewald fail to follow the government’s
instructions? Campbell-Ewald worked closely with the Navy, re-
ceiving approval at every stage in the development of the campaign,
and relied on MindMatics only after the Navy said to do so.133 In
fact, Campbell-Ewald did not deviate from the Navy’s explicit in-
structions by even one iota.134
Applying the logic from Campbell-Ewald to Yearsley underscores
how the holding in Campbell-Ewald diminished the doctrine of
derivative sovereign immunity and created uncertainty regarding
the extent to which private firms and individuals may access the
protections afforded to their governmental counterparts. In Years-
ley, the plaintiffs, landowners along the Missouri River, sued W.A.
States, 340 U.S. 135, 142 (1950); Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1940).





132. Id. at 673-74.
133. Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., No. CV 10-02007 DMG (CWx), 2013 WL 655237, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013), vacated, 768 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016).
134. See id.
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Ross Construction Company, alleging that the company’s construc-
tion of dikes along the river had resulted in the erosion of acres of
farmland.135
In that case, the issues were twofold: (1) whether the alleged
erosion constituted a taking, and (2) whether the construction com-
pany, as a government contractor, could be held liable.136 The Eighth
Circuit acknowledged that the trial court determined that
[t]he evidence established that two dikes built in the river above,
and one dike built opposite, [plaintiffs’] land had diverted the
channel or the current of the river ... and that, as a result, the
‘accretion land’ of the plaintiffs to the extent of perhaps 95 acres
had been eroded and carried away.137
Moreover, there was evidence that “in extending the dike opposite
the plaintiffs’ land ... the contractor ... accelerated the erosion of the
plaintiffs’ land.”138
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court held
that the government contractor was not liable because Congress had
authority to confer upon the contractor the task of building dikes
along the Missouri River and the contractor had not exceeded its au-
thority.139 Notably, the Yearsley Court never considered whether the
contractor violated the government’s explicit instructions.140 Had it
done so, the Court might have reached a different conclusion after
evaluating whether the contractor had used the exact methods of
construction prescribed by the government—if any were prescribed
at all. But the Yearsley Court and others have not endeavored to
determine whether a contractor inadvertently failed to follow
precisely the government’s explicit instructions because doing so
actually discourages collaboration between the contractor and the
government.141
135. W.A. Ross Constr. Co. v. Yearsley, 103 F.2d 589, 590-91 (8th Cir. 1939), aff’d, 309 U.S.
18 (1940).
136. See id. at 591.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1940).
140. See id.
141. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 513 (1988) (“[I]t does not seem to us
sound policy to penalize, and thus deter, active contractor participation in the design process,
1512 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1491
The Court’s new rule, which it incorrectly applied in Campbell-
Ewald itself, has the potential to undermine the government’s abil-
ity to work closely with contractors. Contractors might reasonably
fear that they will face liability if they receive explicit instructions
from the government and something goes wrong, even if the error
was beyond the contractor’s control, as it was in Campbell-Ewald.142
As a result, the number of private individuals and firms willing to
work for the government will likely shrink.143 Moreover, the cost to
the government of contracting work with private contractors will
also increase.144 This might be due not only to a smaller supply of
contractors willing to work for the government but also the contrac-
tors’ fear that collaborating too closely with the government will
expose them to liability under Campbell-Ewald.145
III. THE EXTERNAL COSTS OF CAMPBELL-EWALD CO. V. GOMEZ
This Part considers the unintended consequences of Campbell-
Ewald’s holding. The first Section focuses on the potential increase
in costs for outsourcing government projects as government con-
tractors increase prices to offset the heightened risk of liability. This
Section also argues normatively that there are public policy reasons
for allowing the government as the consumer to avoid internalizing
the risk of liability that might result from litigation. Moreover, this
Section argues that these same public policy reasons underlie the
doctrine of sovereign immunity and bolster the rationale for extend-
ing derivative sovereign immunity to government contractors.
The second Section discusses the potential decrease in quality of
services and products available to the government, as the supply of
potential independent contractors will shrink because many con-
tractors will lack the risk appetite sufficient to take on the increased
risk. This Section also argues that the reduction in the number of
firms available to provide goods or services to the federal govern-
placing the contractor at risk unless it identifies all design defects.”).
142. See Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald, Co., No. CV 10-02007 DMG (CWx), 2013 WL 655237,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2013), vacated, 768 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 663
(2016).
143. See infra Part III.A.
144. See infra Part III.A.
145. See infra Part III.A.
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ment is more problematic than a reduction in the number of firms
selling goods and services to the private sector because the govern-
ment has specialized needs, especially in the area of military
defense, that do not compare to the demands of private individuals
and firms.
A. The Increased Costs of Independent Contractors
The Court’s holding in Campbell-Ewald, because it broke with the
Court’s well-established trend of expanding the scope of immunity
available to government contractors, casts doubt upon whether the
doctrine will prove sufficient to protect private individuals and firms
who work for the government in the future.146 This uncertainty
translates to business risk for potential government contractors that
the cost of doing business on behalf of the government will be higher
than originally anticipated due to the threat of litigation costs.147
These private parties who still wish to perform work on behalf of the
government will have to take steps to insulate themselves from the
risk.148
Most likely, private firms or individuals will increase the price
of the goods or services they provide to offset the added risk.149
Notably, the price increase is not inefficient; instead, the increase
merely makes the government internalize the social cost of doing
business with a private firm or individual subject to liability by
paying higher prices.150 However, this result is troubling from a
normative perspective.
146. See supra Part II.
147. Cf. RICHARD JONES, SUPPLY IN A MARKET ECONOMY 44-45 (Charles Carter ed., 1976)
(explaining that total cost of production of a good or service must consider both fixed and
variable costs).
148. Cf. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 513 (1988) (“[I]t does not seem to us
sound policy to penalize, and thus deter, active contractor participation in the design process,
placing the contractor at risk unless it identifies all design defects.”).
149. See Chester A. Nicholson, Agent Orange Products Liability Litigation, 24 A.F. L. REV.
97, 105 (1984) (“[T]he contractor defense makes sense because in its absence contractors
would ... raise prices to cover the added risks.”).
150. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM THE MARKET AND THE LAW 97 (1988) (explaining that a
market is efficient when the liable business “has to pay for all damage caused and the pricing
system works smoothly” to reflect those costs).
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Throughout the development of the doctrine, courts have rea-
soned that one of the public policy rationales for having a doctrine
of derivative sovereign immunity is to insulate the federal govern-
ment from higher prices for essential goods and services, especially
those with military implications.151 This rationale tracks the reason
that the sovereign immunity doctrine itself exists—to eliminate the
risk that the government will have to bear higher costs when
executing its will for the sake of the public.152 Thus, the Campbell-
Ewald holding directly undermines the interests of the federal
government by exposing private individuals and firms to greater
liability, which the private parties will eventually pass on to the
government in the form of higher prices for the same goods and
services.153
B. The Diminished Quality of the Independent Contractor Market
Increased prices are likely not the only negative results stemming
from the uncertainty created by the Court’s holding in Campbell-
Ewald. There is also the risk that there will be a decrease in the
quality of services and products available to the government, as the
151. See, e.g., Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (“The imposition of liability on Government contrac-
tors will directly affect the terms of Government contracts: either the contractor will decline
to manufacture the design specified by the Government, or it will raise its price. Either way,
the interests of the United States will be directly affected.”); McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp.,
704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[H]olding the supplier liable in government contractor
cases without regard to the extent of government involvement in fixing the product’s design
and specifications would subvert the Feres-Stencel rule since military suppliers, despite the
government’s immunity, would pass the cost of accidents off to the United States through cost
overrun provisions in equipment contracts, through reflecting the price of liability insurance
in the contracts, or through higher prices in later equipment sales.”); Dolphin Gardens, Inc.
v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D. Conn. 1965) (concluding that holding a contractor
liable for the government’s bad judgment would result in increased prices to the government
to cover the contractor’s risk of loss from possible harmful effects); Hunt v. Blasius, 370
N.E.2d 617, 621-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (“A government contract must of necessity be different
in nature from private undertakings. Nearly all government purchases and contracts are
taken by open bidding; necessity exists to obtain the widest possible field of bidders in order
to preserve tax revenues. Should bidders feel apprehensive that they might be sued for fol-
lowing specifications, either of two untoward results could ensue: (1) There would be no bids,
or (2) bids would be inflated to take care of any potential liability. Public policy dictates that
bidders who comply strictly with governmental specifications should be shielded from liability
in any respect in which the product complies.”), aff’d, 384 N.E. 2d 368 (Ill. 1978).
152. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507.
153. See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016).
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supply of potential independent contractors will shrink, because
many contractors will lack the risk appetite sufficient to take on the
increased risk.154 Moreover, there is a risk that, even if suppliers do
not exit the market entirely, government contractors will be reluc-
tant to work too closely with the government for fear that they will
be held liable under Campbell-Ewald for violating one of the gov-
ernment’s explicit instructions.155 Either result underscores the
necessity of a strong derivative sovereign immunity doctrine to in-
sulate government contractors from the unpredictability of litigation
while performing work for the government.
Other commentators and courts have noted that maintaining a
strong government contractor defense is especially important in the
military context to ensure the highest quality of product or service
provided by the private sector to the federal government.156 Further-
more, as the government contractor defense weakens, there will be
greater pressure to secure contractual indemnities between the
government and the contractor, because contractors will find it in-
creasingly difficult to obtain insurance coverage to mitigate the risk
of potential litigation.157
As a result of the increased costs and the limited availability of
insurance, many private individuals and firms likely will be unable
to bear the additional risk of doing business with the government in
the absence of a strong derivative sovereign immunity doctrine.158
Naturally, many of the potential contractors will exit the govern-
ment contractor market, reducing the supply of private individuals
and firms available to perform the government’s work, as demand
either remains the same or increases.159 While it will be more ex-
154. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507.
155. See supra Part II.
156. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513 (“[I]t does not seem to us sound policy to penalize, and thus
deter, active contractor participation in the design process, placing the contractor at risk un-
less it identifies all design defects.”); see also Andrew Finkelman, Suing the Hired Guns: An
Analysis of Two Federal Defenses to Tort Lawsuits Against Military Contractors, 34 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 395, 440-41 (2009) (concluding that the interests in protecting contractors from civil
suit are strong where the government exercises effective control over contractors, and where
the defense is necessary to protect military decision-making and military discipline).
157. See Frank P. Grad, Contractual Indemnification of Government Contractors, 4 ADMIN.
L.J. 433, 436 (1991).
158. See Nicholson, supra note 149, at 105.
159. See Hunt v. Blasius, 370 N.E.2d 617, 621-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977), aff’d, 384 N.E. 2d 386
(Ill. 1978).
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pensive for the government to procure goods and services from the
private market, it is also likely that the government will pay a high-
er price for goods or services that are of lower quality than they had
paid before the supply of contractors shrank.160 That is, because the
higher risk of liability will drive some suppliers out of the market,
the market will become both less competitive and more expensive.161
IV. POTENTIAL PITFALL OF DIMINISHED DERIVATIVE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY: INEFFICIENT VERTICAL GOVERNMENT INTEGRATION
This Part argues that the increased monetary costs to the gov-
ernment of outsourcing projects to private firms could lead the
government to take over the function in question. That is, the in-
creased costs as a result of the diminished doctrine of derivative
sovereign immunity will incentivize the government to integrate
vertically because it will incur lower pecuniary costs in doing so,
even though the private sector could produce the relevant good or
service at a lower social cost.162 Such a result would be both nor-
matively undesirable and economically inefficient.
If the price to the federal government of contracting with private
firms increases, or the market of private firms willing to incur more
liability as a result of the diminished doctrine of derivative sover-
eign immunity shrinks, the federal government might consider a
drastic alternative. Due to increased monetary costs of outsourcing
projects to private firms, the government could reasonably decide to
produce the products or services in question itself. This decision
would be akin to vertical integration in the private sector.163 The
problem with this solution is that it focuses on monetary costs with-
out properly accounting for all transaction costs associated with
vertical integration, including the costs to society more generally.164
An analogous problem arises in the private sector due to antitrust
restrictions under section 1 of the Sherman Act.165 For instance, the
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See Alan J. Meese, Intrabrand Restraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C. L. REV.
5, 9-10 (2004).
163. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 85-86 (1985).
164. See id. at 87. 
165. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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imposition of antitrust liability on various forms of partial vertical
integration in the private sector could induce firms to integrate
completely, even if production and distribution via complete inte-
gration consumes more resources than production and distribution
via partial integration.166 Put another way, courts’ application of
antitrust laws, which seek to maximize wealth in a competitive mar-
ket, has actually resulted in inefficient consequences by privileging
complete integration over partial integration.167
If the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity fails to protect
private firms from the increased risk of litigation costs, the govern-
ment might choose to integrate vertically in order to conserve mon-
etary resources. That is, the federal government faces the same
decision matrix as private firms in choosing whether to integrate
vertically: whether it is more cost effective to solicit bids from
qualified suppliers for the requisite goods and services or to produce
the goods and services itself.168
Missing from the analysis, however, is what the transaction cost
approach has added to the field of economics—an emphasis on or-
ganizational structure and efficient practices of market actors.169
Part of the analysis necessarily involves considering whether such
an organizational structure maximizes social welfare.170 For in-
stance, monopolies are disfavored, even though monopolistic firms
might take advantage of economies of scale, because the lack of com-
petition hurts consumers by imposing on them a higher price than
a competitive market would yield.171 In other instances, vertical
166. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 162, at 9-10 (arguing that antitrust law should treat
certain forms of partial and complete vertical integration as lawful per se to remove incentives
that yield socially inefficient outcomes).
167. See id. (“While complete integration can confer more thorough control on a single,
unified firm, such integration often comes with costs of its own. Partial integration can avoid
these costs while at the same time producing many of the control benefits associated with
complete integration.... As a result, courts should apply the same standards [to each method
of integration].”).
168. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 163, at 88.
169. See id. at 89 (“In fact, however, technology and organizational modes ought to be
treated symmetrically; they are decision variables whose values are determined simultan-
eously.”).
170. See Meese, supra note 162, at 14. 
171. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy and the Social Cost of Monopoly, 78 IOWA
L. REV. 371, 371 (1993) (“The social cost of monopoly is equal to the loss produced by monopoly
pricing and monopoly behavior, minus any social gains that monopoly produces.”).
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integration might be inefficient “because of the incentive and
bureaucratic disabilities of internal organization in production cost
control respects.”172
This is precisely the problem the federal government would face
if it were to elect to produce all goods and services it requires itself
rather than to procure them on the open market. Instead of capi-
talizing on the expertise and efficiencies of private firms, the federal
government would have to invest in infrastructure as well as ex-
pertise in order to provide goods and services of a similar quality as
those available in the market.173 Notably, even if the monetary costs
of creating infrastructure and hiring individuals with the requisite
expertise is less than the monetary cost of acquiring the same goods
or services on the open market, vertical integration might still be
socially inefficient.174 This is because efficiency must account for the
opportunity cost to the government (and by extension, its citizens)
of producing goods, which are already available in the market, in-
stead of investing its limited resources of time and money in other
projects.175
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the doctrine of derivative sovereign immunity is
to protect private firms and individuals working on behalf of the
government as if they were government employees.176 This Note has
illustrated that the doctrine is important because it enables the
government to take advantage of the experience and expertise of
private contractors without exposing those contractors to liability,
which would inevitably raise the price of goods or services.177
Moreover, this Note has demonstrated that the doctrine of deriv-
ative sovereign immunity has expanded over the last seventy years
172. WILLIAMSON, supra note 163, at 91.
173. See id. at 88.
174. See id. at 91.
175. Cf. id. at 88 (“[T]here is no compelling neoclassical reason to prefer integration over
market procurement.”).
176. See Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 387 (2012) (“[I]t should come as no surprise that
the common law did not draw a distinction between public servants and private individuals
engaged in public service in according protection to those carrying out government
responsibilities.”).
177. See supra Part III.
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to apply in a variety of contexts, including public works, products
liability, and civil rights actions, highlighting the usefulness of the
government contractor defense.178 Because the Supreme Court’s
holding in Campbell-Ewald unnecessarily casts doubt on the viabil-
ity of the government contractor defense in situations in which the
contractor allegedly violated federal law and the government gave
the contractor explicit instructions,179 the Supreme Court should
overrule Campbell-Ewald at its earliest opportunity.
The Court’s Campbell-Ewald holding burdens the derivative
sovereign immunity doctrine when federal laws are at issue and also
discourages contractors and the government from working closely
together to avoid the appearance that the government gave the con-
tractor “explicit instructions” in the event that something goes
wrong.180 This perverse incentive flies in the face of the public policy
rationale for derivative sovereign immunity, which is to encourage
the government and contractors to collaborate to achieve the ends
of the government.181
As a result of the increased risk of liability to private contractors,
individuals and firms willing to work on behalf of the government
will likely raise prices to account for the added risk.182 Those con-
tractors unwilling or unable to stomach the added risk will leave the
market, ensuring that prices will go up while the quality of products
and services available to the government will diminish.183
The most damaging effect of the Court’s holding, however, lies in
the way the federal government could reasonably search for an al-
ternative to paying higher pecuniary costs for inferior products and
services. The federal government might vertically integrate to pro-
duce goods and services that it had previously acquired from private
contractors if it could do so at a lower pecuniary cost.184 The problem
with this solution is that it fails to consider whether the private
178. See supra Part I.
179. See Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 672 (2016) (“When a contractor
violates both federal law and the Government’s explicit instructions, as here alleged, no
‘derivative immunity’ shields the contractor from suit by persons adversely affected by the
violation.”).
180. See id.
181. See supra Part II.
182. See supra Part III.A.
183. See supra Part III.B.
184. See supra Part IV.
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sector could produce the relevant good or service at a lower social
cost. If this occurs, an inefficient outcome is likely because vertical
integration by the government will require expanding the size of the
federal bureaucracy, investing in infrastructure, and paying a
premium for expertise, while foregoing other opportunities for more
productive investment—while private resources go wasted.
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